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Abstract
We examine the impact of a unilateral carbon tax in developed countries focusing on the
expected size of carbon leakage (an increase in emissions in non-taxing regions as a
result of the tax) and the effects on leakage of border tax adjustments. We start by
analyzing the problem using a simple two-country, three-good general equilibrium model
to develop intuitions. We then simulate the expected size of the effects using a new,
open-source, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. We analyze the extent of
emissions reductions from a carbon tax in countries that made commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol (Annex B countries), the expected carbon leakage, and the effects of
border tax adjustments on carbon leakage, all relative to our baseline projections for
emissions. We also perform extensive sensitivity tests on the parameters of the CGE
model. Finally, we consider the effects of imperfect border tax adjustments on leakage,
such as global or regional schedules of border taxes.
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The Framework Convention on Climate Change envisions a process
whereby developed nations commit to reducing their emission of greenhouse
gases before developing nations take similar steps. 1 Following this vision, the
Kyoto protocol currently only binds 37 nations to targets on their emissions. 2 No
fast-growing developing nation faces emission limitations.
While there are a number of important motivations for this approach, there
are two central concerns. The first is whether a carbon price that exempts
developing nations can sufficiently reduce global emissions. The developing
world is expected to be a major source of emissions in the future. Even if the
developed world were to cut its emissions drastically, atmospheric carbon dioxide
would not be stabilized by this action alone.
The second concern is that if only developed nations impose carbon
controls, emissions in the developing world might go up, offsetting any
reductions, in a phenomenon known as carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is thought
to arise for two reasons. First, if only a subset of nations impose controls on
emissions of carbon dioxide, energy-intensive production may flee to regions
without controls. Second, if nations with carbon controls use fewer fossil fuels,
the price of fossil fuels may go down, resulting in more use in other regions.
Carbon leakage has the potential to defeat the purpose of having carbon controls,
inefficiently shift the location of production and energy use, and create domestic
political challenges.
Carbon leakage has been a central worry in negotiations regarding an
international climate change treaty and in the design of existing emissions control
systems. For example, the United States has maintained that the possibility of
carbon leakage makes it undesirable and possibly futile for it to impose carbon
controls while major developing countries do not. 3 The major developing
countries, however, insist that the United States (and other developed countries)
must act first to reduce emissions, in accordance with their agreement under the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The result has been an impasse. The
European Union on the other hand has imposed a unilateral carbon price but
1

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107.
2
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
3
See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted) (“[T]he Senate
strongly believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the disparity of treatment
between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission reductions,
could result in serious harm to the United States economy.”).
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constructed the system to prevent leakage by providing subsidies to trade-exposed
industry. 4 The result is a less efficient pricing system.
We analyze the effects of a carbon tax in the developed world and the
resulting carbon leakage. Our focus is on the legal and institutional design choices
that affect carbon leakage with the goal of understanding how to design an
administrable and legal regional carbon tax that most effectively reduces carbon
emissions. For example, we consider whether the location of the collection of the
tax in the production cycle (i.e., upstream or downstream) can affect leakage, how
much border tax adjustments change leakage, and whether administrative or legal
restrictions on the types of border tax adjustments that can be used will change
these conclusions.
Our analysis relies on two different, although related, tools. We use an
analytic general equilibrium model of trade to develop an understanding of the
problem and the likely effects. We then use a new, computable general
equilibrium model of the global economy, CIM-EARTH, to assess the likely size
of the effects and their sensitivity to assumptions. 5
Our emphasis is on understanding the structure of the problem and the
sensitivity of the effects to modeling assumptions and parameters. Simulations of
the sort produced here will always have substantial uncertainties. For those who
want bottom line results, however, we can report the following, with appropriate
caveats. In our simulations, a carbon tax in the Kyoto Protocol Annex B nations
(which roughly make up the developed world) will produce only about one-third
of the reductions of a global tax. Leakage, however, is only a modest part of the
story. Our central measures for leakage under a carbon tax in Annex B, defined as
the increase in emissions in the non-taxing region as a fraction of emissions
reductions in the taxing region, are in the 15-25 percent range. Most of the
reduced emissions in switching from an Annex B tax to a global tax arise because
a global tax will help control the increase in non-Annex B countries which is
expected to occur even without leakage.

4

See Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (A. Denny
Ellerman, Frank J. Converty and Christian De. Perthuis (eds)( 2010) and David Weisbach, Carbon
Taxation in the EU: Expanding the EU Carbon Price, Environmental Law Review (2012), doi:
10.1093/jel/eqr033, for discussions of the design of the EU system.
5
There is a substantial prior literature analyzing carbon leakage, most of it using CGE
models. Other literature analyzes special cases using analytic general (or sometimes partial)
equilibrium models. Part 2 contains an extensive attempt at replicating the results of prior CGE
models; the relevant work is cited there..
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We also simulate the effects of border tax adjustments, taxes on the
emissions from the production of an imported good and rebates of domestic
carbon taxes on the export of goods. Border tax adjustments are thought to reduce
leakage because they reduce the incentive to shift production abroad. In our
simulations, border tax adjustments reduce leakage substantially. They result in an
increase in emissions in the taxing region and a reduction in the non-taxing
region, relative to a production tax. This finding is consistent with our
understanding of the reasons why leakage occurs, which we discuss below.
Finally, we simulate the effects of an imperfect border tax system. Border
tax adjustments are complex to administer because they require the importing
country to determine the emissions from the production of a good produced
abroad. Knowledge of the particular and constantly changing production
processes and energy sources in other countries may not be available. Moreover,
there may be legal concerns with some types of border taxes because of the
relevant WTO rules. Therefore, we consider presumptive border tax adjustments
under which there are schedules of the appropriate border tax adjustments for
different types of goods. We compare presumptive schedules of this sort to
perfect border tax adjustments. In our simulations, presumptive schedules are not
as effective as perfect border taxes. The imperfect systems we simulate result in
roughly double the leakage arising from perfect border taxes, although the size of
the differences vary based on the type of system and the tax rate. We do not
attempt to measure the savings in administrative costs; presumptive schedules
may be superior, all things considered.
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth a brief detour to discuss our
methodology. Large computational models, particularly computable general
equilibrium models such as the model used here, are not commonly found in the
legal literature. Even the most advanced computational models are thought to be
too crude to capture legal reasoning, which is a mixture of analogical reasoning,
the close reading of statutes, knowledge of history, and an understanding of how
legal rules fit within a given social, legal, and institutional structure. Moreover,
sufficiently advanced computation may not be sufficiently transparent and might
depend critically on the model structure and available data.
Law and economics seeks to understand the effects of legal rules through
the use of economic methodology. It is a forward looking, pragmatic quest for
solutions to legal problems. We view computation as a potential tool for law and
economics to gain insights into the likely effects of legal rules and the design of
institutions. In the present case, for example, analytic models and econometric
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techniques, both widely used in law and economics, are unlikely to be able to give
a sense of the magnitude of carbon leakage, to analyze the size of the effects of
border tax adjustments, and to compare perfect border taxes with imperfect border
taxes. We can study all of these issues with a computational model. For example,
by comparing perfect and imperfect border taxes, we are able to consider the
effect of a possible WTO ruling on the issue in ways that cannot easily be done
through more traditional methods.
We address the criticisms of computation in four ways. First, we use an
analytic model to generate economic intuitions and hypotheses, much like studies
which rely solely on analytic models. We think of the analytic model as a “model
of the model.” If the results produced by the computational model are not
consistent with the predictions of the analytic model, we can then go back to try to
understand the underlying economic forces. Combining analytic and
computational models allows us to gain insights into the problem that might be
less accessible if we considered only numerical simulations. Computation
becomes an addition to rather than a substitute for conventional legal and
economic reasoning. It becomes a way of estimating the likely magnitude of the
effects that we expect to see from the analytic model and a way of testing the
robustness of the analytic model to more complex specifications. 6
Second, we make our code open source, downloadable from our website. 7
All of our code and model assumptions can be examined by anyone. 8 We
encourage replication of our results and testing them for robustness to alternative
specifications.

6

Ken Judd discusses the complementarity between computational and analytic models as
follows. Analytic models must make strong simplifying assumptions but are able to establish
proofs of results within their limited domain. Computational models are able to sample from a
much larger space but can only show results from the particular points which are sampled. The
two together help get a fuller understanding of an issue than either could alone. Kenneth L. Judd,
Computationally Intensive Analysis in Economics, Handbook of Computational Economics
Introduction to the Handbook in Computational Economics (Leigh Tesfatsion and Kenneth L.
Judd (eds) (2006).
7
Center for Robust Decision making on Climate and Energy Policy (RDCEP) web site,
www.rdcep.org
8
Our model is currently implemented in the AMPL programming language, which
requires a license. In addition, we use Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data, which must be
purchased (at modest cost). Therefore, unfortunately, actually running our code is not free,
although anyone may obtain the necessary licenses. While we plan to switch to an open-source
software system, GTAP data is by far the most comprehensive data, and there does not appear to
be a viable alternative. Nevertheless, the underlying code and all of its assumptions can be freely
examined.
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Third, we test the robustness of the model results to our parameter choices.
We consider how the results change when central parameters change, both alone
and in combination. We present some of these results here and document
additional tests on our website.
Finally, we attempt to replicate prior studies of the problem within our
model. While we cannot replicate the precise model structures used in prior
studies, we can use their parameter choices in our model. Doing so helps show
whether differences in model results are due to different parameter choices, model
structures, or other unspecified factors.
The result, we hope, shows the potential for using computation to address
legal problems. While computation is not suited to all legal problems, in many
cases computation can be valuable in understanding the expected effects of a legal
rule as an addition to the usual ways of gaining understanding.
This paper comes in two parts. Part 1 discusses the analytic model. We
present the basic assumptions of the model and then describe the intuitions behind
the solution. The mathematical statement of the model and derivation of the
solution is available on our website. We also provide a numerical simulation of
the results using parameters derived from the data we use in our CGE model. The
simulation allows us to show the solutions graphically and to see the sensitivity of
the results to the central parameters. Part II focuses on CIM-EARTH. The
documentation for CIM-EARTH is provided on our website and we do not cover
the details here. After giving a brief background on the model structure, we
describe several elements of CIM-EARTH that are central to this study: the
treatment of trade, our data sources, and our parameter estimates. We then present
our results from CIM-EARTH, show their sensitivity to central parameter choices,
and attempt to replicate the results from prior studies of carbon leakage.
1.

Analytic model of carbon taxation

As noted, the standard view is that there are two causes of leakage. 9 First,
when only one part of the world taxes emissions, energy-intensive production
shifts from the taxing region to the non-taxing region; shifting energy-intensive
production to the non-taxing region avoids the tax. Second, because the tax
reduces energy use in the taxing regions, overall energy prices may fall, creating
an incentive for greater energy use (and emissions) in the non-taxing region. In
9

See, e.g., Niven Winchester, Sergey Paltsev, and John M. Reilly, Will Border Carbon
Adjustments Work?, 11 B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Article 7 (2011).
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this section, we use a simple model to consider how these effects arise under
different types of taxes.
Model structure and assumptions. Consider a world with only two regions
or countries: Home, which imposes a tax on emissions and Foreign, which does
not. Each country has a pool of labor, L and L*, and fossil fuel deposits E and E*
(where variables with asterisks denote Foreign). Assume that these factors cannot
be traded: there is no migration and fossil fuel deposits are in the ground. 10
Some goods, such as services, can be produced solely with labor. We call
these goods collectively the labor-good or l-good. The production of other goods,
which we call the energy-intensive-good or ei-good, needs energy. To create
energy, the deposits have to be extracted. 11 The resulting energy, such as coal or
gas, is then used in production, in combination with labor, to produce the ei-good.
Emissions are created when the energy is used, and we assume that emissions are
proportional to energy use. We do not model damages from emissions.
Our goal is to understand how trade affects emissions. (If there were no
trade at all, Foreign activity would not be affected by a Home carbon tax.) To this
end, assume that all goods – energy, the l-good and the ei-good – are traded
costlessly. This means that there is a single global price of energy, a single global
price of the l-good, and a single global wage rate. 12 To differentiate foreign and
domestic production, we assume that Home and Foreign varieties of the ei-good
are different and that consumers prefer their local variety; there is a home bias.
(The l-good and energy, however, are homogenous.) 13 Therefore, there is an eigood and an ei*-good each of which can be traded.

10

This means that we assume deposits cannot be purchased. Bard Harstad, Buy Coal?
Deposit Markets and Environmental Policy, forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy (2012),
considers the effects of a market for deposits.
11
Extraction, in our model, has increasing marginal costs. Marginal costs will be
increasing if, for example, the deposits with the lowest extraction cost are used first, then more
expensive deposits, and so forth.
12
We consider only equilibria in which each country produces some of the l-good, a
condition that is easily checked given the parameters of the model.
13
To keep the model simple, we use Cobb-Douglas production functions and utility
functions. These take the form Q = X Y , where γ is the share spent on X in production or
consumption (depending on what the function is representing) and (1-γ) is the share of Y. Because
we use Cobb-Douglas functions, the relative spending shares of goods, both in production and
consumption are fixed. This limits the analysis somewhat.
Note that the model we used in an earlier version of the paper is a special case of the
current model. See Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Sam Kortum, Todd Munson, Fernando Cervantes
Perez and David Weisbach, Trade and Carbon Taxes, 100 American Economic Review 465-69
γ

(1 − γ )
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We will consider three tax systems in Home as well as a global tax. The
first, which we call a production tax, is imposed on Home use of energy in
production. The second, which we call a BTA tax, is a production tax with border
tax adjustments. The border tax adjustments are (1) a tax on embedded carbon in
imports in the ei*-good; and (2) a rebate of production taxes previously paid on
the ei-good when it is exported. 14 Together, these two aspects of border tax
adjustments mean that there is a tax on home consumption of ei-type goods and
no tax on foreign consumption of ei-type goods. We can, therefore, think of a
BTA tax as a tax on the carbon content of consumption in Home (as compared to
a tax on production in Home under a production tax). The final tax is a tax on the
extraction of fossil fuels. 15 We can think of the extraction tax as an upstream tax,
the production tax as a mid-stream tax, and the BTA tax as a fully downstream
tax. Figure 1 presents a picture of the model structure. (The core model equations
are presented in the Appendix.)

Figure 1: Structure of the Analytic model

(May 2010). The key differences are that in our prior work, there was no home bias in
consumption and there was no separate production process to convert energy into a consumption
good. Setting the relevant parameters correctly converts the model used here into that model.
14
The rebate in our model is based on the aggregate energy use in production of the eigood. If there were individual firms, they would take this rebate (per unit produced) as given. This
approach avoids the problem of firms using dirty technology for export and clean technology for
domestic use.
15
We need not separately consider an extraction tax with border adjustments as this is
equivalent to a production tax.
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No-tax case. If there are no taxes, the analysis is straightforward. The
countries produce energy in proportion to their relative endowments; the country
with the greater endowment will extract more, up to the point at which marginal
extraction costs are equated across countries. This efficiency condition arises
because extraction has increasing marginal costs, energy is traded so there is a
single global price, and labor costs are the same in both countries. The location of
energy use, however, is not related to extraction. Instead, because energy is
traded, its use depends on the relative demand for each country’s variety of the eigood. The country facing higher demand for its energy-intensive products will use
more energy. The direction of net trade in energy can go either way as the country
with greater deposits could have even greater relative energy demand.
Production tax. A production tax in Home creates a wedge between the
world energy price and the cost of energy as an input to produce the ei-good. To
some extent, the tax can be absorbed by using less energy in the production of the
ei-good. But after this, the price of the ei-good has to go up. As a result,
consumers in both countries will substitute away from the Home variety of the eigood. Overall, emissions in Home (which come from the production of the eigood) fall both because of less energy use in production and because of fewer
global purchases of the Home variety of the ei-good.
The effects in Foreign are essentially the reverse of the effects in Home.
Less energy is used in Home due to the tax, which means that the price of energy
falls. The use of energy in the production of the ei*-good, therefore, is cheaper. To
some extent, production of the ei*-good will be more energy-intensive and to
some extent the price of the ei*-good will fall. As a result, consumers around the
world demand more of the ei*-good, resulting in greater production and emissions
in the foreign country. There is a production-location effect and an energy-price
effect, corresponding to the two types of leakage noted in the literature.
A key parameter in determining the extent of leakage is the amount by
which the supply of energy falls due to the decline in the price of energy resulting
from the tax: the price elasticity of energy supply. 16 If the supply is completely
insensitive to price, total energy production remains the same even with a carbon
tax. We get 100% leakage. This might be a world where the marginal source of
energy is Saudi Arabia (i.e., with oil that can be extracted at a low cost) and Saudi

16

This approach is consistent with other analytic models of leakage. See Hans-Werner
Sinn, Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach, 15 Int’l tax and Public
Finance 360-394 (2008); Harstad, Buy Coal, note 10.
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Arabia simply pumps out the same amount of oil regardless of the price. 17 A
carbon tax has no effect on emissions; it just reduces the rents received by energy
producers. At the other extreme, if the quantity of energy produced is highly
sensitive to the price, leakage will be low. We might think of this world as one
where the marginal source of energy is Canadian tar sands (i.e., the energy is
difficult and expensive to produce so small decreases in the price of energy can
lead to large reductions in production). Leakage can approach zero because the
tax reduces energy supply with little reduction in the energy price.
BTA tax. Consider how the results change if we add border tax
adjustments. We can think of a production tax with border tax adjustments as
falling on Home consumption of ei-type goods (i.e., both the ei-good and the ei*good). As a result, Home consumption of ei-type goods of both varieties goes
down. The reduction in demand in Home means that overall less energy is used to
satisfy Home demand, resulting in a lower price of energy. The price of both eitype goods goes down in Foreign which raises demand for them there. Finally,
production of the ei-good becomes less energy intensive while production of the
ei*-good becomes more energy intensive.
The net effects are driven to a large extent by the degree of home bias.
Consumers in Home prefer their variety of the ei-good, so when they decrease
their demand for all ei-type goods, the effect falls more heavily on Home
production. Similarly, Foreign consumers prefer their variety of the good, so
when they increase their demand, more of the additional production takes place in
Foreign. The result is emissions reductions in Home, and emissions increases in
Foreign. Globally, there is a net reduction in emissions but there is still leakage
under the BTA tax. 18
The source of leakage in the production tax case and the border tax case is
different. In the production tax case, leakage arises because of the increased
global demand for the ei*-good and because of the increased energy-intensity in
Foreign production used to meet that demand. In the BTA tax case, leakage arises
from increased Foreign demand for both varieties of the ei-good and the fact that
much of that demand will be met by Foreign production (and because production
there becomes more energy intensive).
17

It is not easy to characterize Saudi Arabia’s strategy and we just use it as a placeholder
example without making specific claims about its production choices.
18
We know there is a global reduction in emissions because the tax directly hits Home
consumption while foreign consumption goes up only through the indirect effect of the tax on
energy prices which is tempered by shifts in the energy-intensity of production.
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The effect of the elasticity of energy supply is similar in both the
production tax and BTA tax cases, however: a low elasticity increases leakage.
The reason is that in both cases, a low elasticity of energy supply means that
supply does not go down much in response to the tax; instead the tax is absorbed
into the pre-tax world energy price. The lower world energy price (and relatively
fixed supply of energy) results in increased production of ei-type goods in
Foreign.
Extraction tax. The final tax we consider is an extraction tax in Home. The
extraction tax lowers the after-tax price received by Home energy producers. The
resulting decrease in Home energy supply raises the global price of energy,
creating an incentive for more extraction abroad. Because of the unified global
price of energy, ei-type production in the two countries faces the same change: an
overall higher price of energy. Production will become more labor intensive and
global demand for ei-type goods of both varieties will go down. The location of
the production declines could be in either country.
To illustrate the effects, imagine that all of the energy deposits were in
Home. Then all energy producers will bear the extraction tax resulting in reduced
supply and a decline in its use in production of ei-type goods. The decline will be
in both countries, with the share of the decline depending on the relative global
demand for each variety of the ei-good. If there are energy deposits in Foreign as
well, then an increase in extraction there offsets the reduction in extraction in
Home, but does not affect where the ei-type good production declines occur. If all
deposits are in Foreign, of course the extraction tax has no effect. The
effectiveness of an extraction tax depends on having a substantial portion of fuel
deposits being covered.
In a strict sense, an extraction tax generates no leakage in that foreign
energy use does not go up. It will, in fact, go down because of the global increase
in energy costs. Nevertheless, we can think of there being leakage in the sense
that foreign activity – here extraction of additional deposits – partially offsets the
effects of the tax in Home. Leakage in this sense goes up with the supply
elasticity, which is in contrast to the effects of the supply elasticity on leakage (in
the production sense) under production and BTA taxes.
We can, therefore, think of an extraction tax as an alternative and quite
different type of tax than a production or BTA tax. It works by raising the price of
energy, which if energy is traded, is a global phenomenon. In contrast, a
production tax raises the price of energy use in a particular location and a
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production tax with border tax adjustments raises the price of consumption in a
particular location. If leakage is a serious concern, an extraction tax might be
attractive. The downside is that an extraction tax is only effective if a substantial
portion of global deposits are covered or if the supply in non-taxed regions is
inelastic. 19
Global tax. The most desirable policy would be one that harmonizes
carbon policy around the world. If both countries impose a tax (of the same kind
and at the same rate), the distinctions between the different types of taxes largely
disappears. Production and extraction taxes create the same wedge between the
cost of energy as an input and the price received by those who extract energy.
There is, as a result, a shift toward more labor-intensive production of ei-type
goods and an increase in the price of those goods. Similarly, a BTA tax and a
production tax have the same effects on prices, production, and consumption.
The key difference between the three types of taxes under a global tax
system is the allocation of the tax revenue. Under an extraction tax, the country
where the extraction takes place gets the revenue; under a production tax, the
country where production takes place gets the revenue; and under the BTA tax,
the country where consumption takes place gets the revenue. As a result, the
choice of taxes may have distributional effects. Note that these effects can be
offset through transfer payments between the countries.
Simulations. To get a sense of the predictions of our analytic model, we
parameterized it to roughly coincide with the data we use for our CGE model. We
then run simulations to test the sensitivity of results to changes in the central
variables.
Figure 2 shows effects of the three taxes we study on emissions. The
global tax reduces global emissions around twice as much as a production tax
(i.e., a tax only Home). This result can be seen by comparing the top and bottom
lines. We can get a visual sense of leakage by comparing Home reductions under
a production tax and global reductions under the same tax. The higher global
emissions (smaller reductions) are due to the increase in Foreign emissions
because of the tax, which is leakage. Finally, if we add border taxes, global
emissions go down relative to a production tax; it appears that leakage is smaller.
19

Many deposits are located outside of Annex B countries, possibly making an extraction
tax less effective than other taxes, at least if non-Annex B countries are not to be subject to
emissions restrictions and supply is price elastic. Harstad, Buy Coal, note 10, suggests that the
taxing countries can make the supply in non-taxing countries price inelastic by purchasing
reserves held by non-taxing countries.
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Figure 2: Effects of various taxes on emissions in analytic model

Figure 3 focuses on the effects of border taxes. Like Figure 2, it shows the
global emissions reductions under a Home production tax, Home reductions under
that tax, and global reductions under a border tax system. It adds a line showing
Home reductions when there are border taxes. Home emissions go up when we
add a border tax (comparing the bottom two lines). If climate treaties are based on
emissions targets for different regions, border taxes will actually make the target
more difficult to reach in Home.
Border taxes reduce leakage in this model. We define the leakage rate as
the increase in global emissions relative to reduction in emissions in the taxing
region under a given tax. 20 With border taxes, it is based on the difference
between the middle two lines in Figure 3. Relative to a production tax, border
taxes increase Home emissions and reduce global emissions, and both effects
contribute to a reduction in the leakage rate.

20

Formally, if a region x imposes a tax, leakage is (ΔemisisonsWorld Δemissionsx)/Δemissionsx. This means that leakage under a global tax is defined to be zero
(because the numerator is always zero). This does not mean, however, that there are no changes in
the location of production or consumption under a global tax which may be of interest to policymakers.
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Figure 3: Emissions under Production and BTA taxes

Figure 4 shows the effect of the elasticity of energy supply on leakage for
the production and BTA taxes with a tax rate of about $29/ton of CO2. The upper
line is the production tax; the lower line the BTA tax. As we can see, leakage is
lower under the BTA tax. Both taxes, however, respond similarly to the supply
elasticity and as the elasticity approaches zero, leakage becomes high in both
cases. As the elasticity goes up, leakage goes down, and in fact becomes slightly
negative with border taxes. 21

21

Negative leakage appears to arise because Home is the dominant consumer of the ei*good, and its demand goes down. If the elasticity of energy supply is large enough, this effect
dominates the energy price decline (which stimulates Foreign production). A recent paper shows
that leakage can be negative if (1) the output of the untaxed sector or region is not a perfect
substitute for the output of the taxed sector, (2) the taxed sector or region can reduce carbon per
unit of output, and (3) capital or labor are mobile between sectors or regions. See Don Fullerton,
Daniel Karney, and Kathy Baylis, Negative Leakage, working paper, (2011) (available at:
http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/61Fullerton et al). Under those conditions, they show that
the sector or region facing the carbon tax might reduce carbon per unit of output by using
resources drawn away from the other sector or region, shrinking that other sector’s output and
emissions. That mechanism is not operational here, however, because we have assumed that the
tax on carbon applies to all Home sectors, while neither labor nor capital are mobile
internationally. If our model were to satisfy those three conditions, then leakage might be lower.
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Figure 4: Leakage as a function of energy supply elasticity

We can examine changes in production and consumption in more detail
through what we call carbon matrices. We present these results in Table 1, which
shows changes from the no-tax case for an $11/ton tax on CO2. The rows
represent production. For example, the top row is Home energy use in production.
The columns represent consumption. The first column in the first row is the
energy use for Home production of goods consumed domestically. The second
column in the first row is the energy use for goods produced in Home and
exported to (and consumed in) Foreign. The last column is total production in
each country. The bottom row is total consumption in each region.
We can see in the case of the production tax that Home energy use in
production goes down more than Home consumption while Foreign energy use in
production goes up, illustrating carbon leakage. Foreign consumption actually
goes down because of the substantial decrease in imports of the ei-good. If we add
border tax adjustments, there is a large drop in Foreign production (relative to the
production tax case) for export to Home. Total Foreign production goes down.
Production tax
Home
Foreign
Home
-42.9% -44.2%
Foreign
10.3%
7.9%
Cons.
-26.0%
-8.7%

BTA tax
Prod.
-43.1%
9.2%
-21.0%

Home
Foreign
Cons.

Home
Foreign
-42.9% -36.0%
-2.1%
8.7%
-29.6%
-5.6%

Table 1: Carbon matrices in snalytic model

Prod.
-41.4%
2.9%
-22.6%
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One surprising result from the analytic model is the comparison of the
global welfare effects of the production and BTA taxes. We can compare these
effects by setting the tax rate so that emissions are the same under the two
policies. If emissions are the same, we can ignore the damages from emissions (as
they will be the same under either policy) and simply consider welfare from
consumption.
Set the tax rates so that emissions are the same under a production tax
system and a BTA tax and consider each country’s income. There are only two
sources of income: labor and returns from exploiting energy deposits. The total
labor is fixed and its wage is always 1 in the model, so to measure income, we
need only consider the returns from exploiting energy deposits. If emissions are
the same under the two tax systems, the total deposits extracted must be the same.
If the same deposits are extracted in the two scenarios, the price of energy is also
the same. That is, if we set the tax rates so that emissions are the same under a
production tax and a BTA tax, the returns from exploiting deposits will be the
same. Overall income is unchanged (except for the tax revenues received by
Home).
Foreign’s income is the same under the production tax and the BTA tax.
Climate damages are the same. This means that we can analyze its welfare solely
by reference to how much individuals there can consume. With the production
tax, foreign consumption of the Home-variety of the ei-good includes the tax
while under the BTA tax, it does not. Consumers in Foreign can consume more
under the BTA tax. Therefore, they are better off with border taxes.
Analysis of Home is more complex. If we leave aside tax revenue, it is
clear that Home is worse off with border taxes for the same reasons that Foreign
is better off. Tax revenue, however, means that Home’s income may not be the
same in the two cases. If tax revenues are lower when there are border taxes, then
Home is worse off. If tax revenues are higher, we have to weigh the additional
income against the higher cost of goods, so whether Home is better or worse off
will depend on the parameters.
These results about welfare are contrary to standard intuitions which hold
that the taxing regions will want to impose border taxes and the non-taxing
regions will oppose them. U.S. climate change legislation regularly includes
measures to protect domestic industries while developing countries strenuously
object to these measures. The simple model is not capturing something going on
in the world that motivates political preferences over these policies.
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We have three hypotheses about what these motivations are. The first is
that views about border taxes are informed by flawed mercantilist thinking, and
that if analysts focused on consumer welfare they would agree with the results of
our model. Second, our model abstracts from considerations of good or bad jobs
or unemployment. The wage is always 1 regardless of where individuals work.
There are also no producer profits. If for some reason wages vary across
industries (in ways not related to worker productivity), there could be reasons for
preferring one system or the other. Finally, our model does not have adjustment
costs. It might be the case that in the long run the results of our model would
obtain but it is not easy to take a steel worker and turn him into a nurse. To the
extent there are efficiency wages (or similar effects) or transition costs, these
effects should temper our result, but we would still expect the effects we see in
the model to occur in the real world.
2.

CGE Modeling of Leakage

Given the understanding of the issue from the analytic model, we can test
the results in our CGE model and also assess the likely size of the effects. We
present the results from this effort here beginning with background on the model.
2.1.

CIM-EARTH structure

The detailed structure of CIM-EARTH is described in its documentation,
and we refer interested readers there. 22 We describe here the basic structure of the
model, how trade is treated, and our data sources. While the model is detailed and
complex, in many ways it remains greatly simplified. Some, and perhaps many, of
the simplifications can be justified as removing unnecessary complexity, but
because some may affect the results, it is important to be aware of the major
simplifications we make. We highlight them here.
As in all CGE models, individuals own labor and capital, which they
provide to industry in exchange for wages and rents. They use this income to
purchase goods and to save so as to maximize their utility. In the current version
of the model, labor supply is fixed – consumers do not respond to carbon taxes by
working less. In addition, individuals are not forward looking, in that they do not
anticipate the future; they save because it brings them utility.

22

www.rdcep.org and Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Kenneth Judd, Elisabeth Moyer, and
Todd Munson, CIM-EARTH: Framework and Case Study, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy: Vol. 10: Issue 2 (Symposium), Article 11 (2010).
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Industry hires labor, rents capital, and buys intermediate inputs, which it
combines to create goods. The industry structure is designed to mimic how goods
actually flow in our economy. For example, the energy sector uses labor, energy,
capital, and deposits to extract energy which is then sold to industries (including
the energy industry itself) and households. That is, industry output can be
intermediate goods used by other industries or final goods used by consumers.
The intermediate goods are used by industries to similarly produce a mix of final
and intermediate goods. Eventually, all output is in the form of final goods
consumed by individuals or accumulated into stocks of capital.
Industry production functions use a common flexible functional form
which allows us to set input shares based on data and allows industries to
substitute across inputs based on specified elasticities of substitution. Industries
choose the mix of inputs and outputs to maximize profit. The solution to the
model involves a set of prices and outputs which makes markets clear in each
time period.
The version of the model used for this study has 16 regions and 16 sectors.
Each sector has a single representative consumer (we do not study distributional
effects). We present the results of our simulations with fewer regions simply for
ease of reading; the underlying model is always run with 16 regions and 16
sectors. The current version of the model has only a single type of capital within
each region; there are no vintages and capital is perfectly mobile across sectors
but immobile across regions. 23 Labor supply is also completely mobile across
sectors within each region and completely immobile across regions. As noted, we
do not model the effects of taxes on labor supply: labor supply is determined by
population growth, which is exogenous.
Many of the central parameters are exogenous. In particular, labor
productivity, energy efficiency, land endowment and yield, and resource
availability are all modeled based on estimates of exogenous trends. As we
discuss below, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to changes in these
estimates. We do not, however, attempt to make them endogenous. One
justification for using exogenous trends is that we view the model as producing
results for the medium-term, so the tax may not have large effects on business-asusual trends. The effects of a regional carbon tax may be much different in the
long-term as it is both easier to shift production abroad in the long term and,
23

An important implication of this assumption is the there is no foreign direct investment
in our model. Foreign direct investment may be an important channel of leakage.
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offsetting this effect, the taxes may substantially influence energy efficiency. It is,
in future studies, important to make energy efficiency endogenous, particularly
for studies of longer-term effects.
A central component of any study of the effects of trade on carbon
taxation is how trade is represented in the model. The standard approach in CGE
models, which we follow, is to treat each region as producing a slightly different
variety of each good. We treat steel from South Korea as a different commodity
from steel produced in the United States. Purchasers of the goods have
preferences over the varieties and will substitute across the varieties depending on
their prices. These elasticities of substitution are known as the Armington
elasticities after the inventor of this representation of trade. If the two goods are
similar – the origin of steel of a given type might not matter – the Armington
elasticity would be high. 24
The Armington elasticity approach to trade is not based on modern
theories of trade but can be consistent with them. 25 It is highly flexible, and we
believe it is a reasonable aggregate representation of trade for purposes of
modeling. As discussed below, we test the sensitivity of our results to differing
assumptions about the central Armington elasticities.
To complement the Armington representation of trade, we include detail
on the transport sector. Steel produced in South Korea has to be shipped to the
United States if it is to be used in the United States. Shipping and other means of
transport are included in our industry structure as a necessary input into traded
goods. The transport industry uses energy, so taxes on energy affect transport
costs.
We use data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). 26 GTAP is a
global database with individual country input-output data and bilateral trade and
transport data. It covers 113 regions and 57 different commodities. We aggregate
the data into 16 regions and 16 commodities. GTAP collects the data through a

24

We use Armington elasticities to measure substitution across imported goods,
producing what we call an import bundle. The substitution elasticity of this bundle with domestic
goods is the import elasticity. The import elasticity measures the competitiveness of domestic
production against imports. In this paper, we generically refer to this entire representation as an
Armington representation of trade and the overall set of elasticities the Armington elasticities.
25
See Costas Arkolakis, Arnaud Costinot, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, New Trade Models,
Same Old Gains?, 102 American Economic Review 94-130 (2012).
26
Documentation is available at www.gtap.org
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global network of governments and researchers. We ran our study using GTAP 7,
covering the year 2004, which was the most recent version available at the time.
The more difficult and problematic data requirement is determining the
parameters of the model, primarily the substitution elasticities. These elasticities
determine how firms and individuals respond to changes in prices. For example,
we want to know how industries will respond if the price of energy goes up, and
this depends on firms’ ability to substitute away from energy inputs. These
elasticities cannot be directly observed. They must be estimated. We base our
elasticities on those used in the MIT CGE model used to evaluate climate policies
(known as EPPA). MIT obtained these from a literature search and where the
literature was not available, elicitation from experts in the relevant industry. 27 We
do not have a high level of confidence in these elasticities and, therefore, test the
sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications.
Before turning to our simulations, we highlight the key differences
between CIM-EARTH and our analytic model. The core models are designed to
be similar: the analytic model is essentially a simplified model of CIM-EARTH
with far less detail, fewer sectors, and so forth. Nevertheless, there are some
important differences. One is that the analytic model uses Cobb-Douglas
production and consumption functions, which greatly limits flexibility (because
spending shares on inputs or consumption are fixed). The CGE model uses a more
flexible functional form which allows input shares to vary. A second is that the
analytic model ignores the cost of trading goods so that, absent taxes, the law of
one price holds internationally. An implication is that factor rewards are also
equated across countries. In contrast, CIM-EARTH is calibrated to actual bilateral
trade flows by sector, with costs of trade accounting for differences in import
shares across countries. A third is that, while the analytic model has only one
factor of production (labor) that is mobile across sectors, CIM-EARTH also
incorporates physical capital used in production. Finally, energy is a
homogeneous good in the analytic model while CIM-EARTH incorporates the
different carbon content, transport costs, prices, and imperfect substitutability
between coal, natural gas, and petroleum. This last distinction is particularly
important as substitution away from coal is one of the main effects of instituting a
moderate price of carbon.

27

See Mort Webster, Sergey Paltsev, John Parsons, John Reilly, and Henry Jacoby,
Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Costs of Atmospheric Stabilization, Report No.
165, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, November 2008.
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Current trade patterns

Before turning to our simulations, it is helpful to examine existing trade
patterns. Figure 5 shows the relationship between exposure to trade and the
energy intensity of production for Annex B. 28 Trade exposure is the percent of
local consumption in Annex B coming from imports from non-Annex B countries.
Energy intensity is energy use per dollar of revenues for the industry. The size of
the bubbles is the CO2 emissions.
Trade Exposure
Leather/apparel

27%
Electronics manufacturing

22%
Textiles

17%
Other
manufacturing.

Largescale ag

12%
Sugar
Manufacture
of machinery

7%

Motor
vehicle
manufacturing

Non-ferrous metals

Wood manufacturing

Water transport
Non-metallic Minerals

Paper

2%

Land transport

Chemicals
Water

Gov't

-3%
-2.5%

Iron & Steel

Fabricated metal

2.5%

7.5%

Water
transport

12.5%

17.5%

22.5%

27.5%

Energy Intensity

Figure 5: Trade Exposure v. Energy Intensity for Annex B

None of the products with the highest trade exposure are energy intensive:
apparel, electronics, and textiles have high trade exposures but require little
energy to produce. There are no product categories in the upper-right part of the
figure. Services, which occupy the bottom left corner take little energy to produce
and are not substantially exposed to trade. The product categories that are most
likely to be affected by a tax on emissions are in the lower-right quadrant of the
graph: non-ferrous metals (e.g., aluminum, copper, and titanium), iron and steel,
chemicals, non-metallic minerals and, perhaps, paper. Non-ferrous metals in
particular stand out as both energy-intensive and exposed to trade. The transport
sectors – air, water, and land – are also energy intensive and somewhat exposed to
28

This figure is similar to Figure 1.3 in Trevor Houser et al, Leveling the Carbon Playing
Field: International Competition and U.S. Climate Policy Design (2008), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/leveling_the_carbon_playing_field.pdf. We use GTAP 7 data and analyze it for
Annex B while Houser looks at the United States. Houser shows notably larger import shares than
we do. We suspect this is because he looks at the United States, while we look at Annex B (so that
trade within Annex B does not show up as imports).
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trade. It is not clear, however, whether production in these sectors can shift abroad
in response to a tax on emissions as their output may be tied to a particular
locality.
We can get a better sense of how energy-intensive goods are being traded
around the globe by considering where imports come from. Table 2 provides the
share of imports into the United States for five energy-intensive goods by origin.
Non-Annex-B countries are in gray. Canada dominates the imports of these goods
and other Annex-B countries also have large shares. The major exception to this
patterns is cement, where China is the largest importer.
U.S. Imports by Origin, 2004
Iron & Steel

Non-ferrous metals

Chemicals

Paper

Cement

Rank

Source

Share

Source

Share

Source

Share

Source

Share

Source

Share

1

Canada

14.9

Canada

35.9

Canada

16.0

Canada

55.1

China

15.6

2

Mexico

9.6

Russia

9.8

Japan

9.4

China

6.4

Italy

12.9

3

Brazil

9.3

Peru

6.2

China

9.1

Finland

4.4

Canada

11.0

4

China

7.2

Mexico

5.2

Ireland

8.0

Germany

4.0

Mexico

10.5

5

Russia

5.7

Brazil

4.8

Germany

7.5

Mexico

3.7

Brazil

6.2

Table 2: Country of origin for imports to Annex B of energy-intensive goods

Finally, we can measure trade in what we call embedded carbon. 29 By
embedded carbon we mean the carbon emitted in the production of a good, not
carbon which is physically in the good. To do this, we start with the standard
measure of emissions, which is based on the physical location of the combustion
of fossil fuels. We trace how the resulting goods move through the economy and
attribute the emissions to the places where goods are consumed. The result is a
matrix which is essentially the same as the matrices we used for the analytic
model except it covers many regions and is based on actual trade patterns.
In particular, standard measures of emissions, including the Framework
Convention’s mandatory carbon inventories, attribute emissions to the location
where the greenhouse gas is actually released into the atmosphere. For example, if
29

We follow a prior literature that uses a similar methodology, known as multi-region
input-output analysis. For a summary of this literature, see T. Wiedmann, A Review of Recent
Multi-region Input-Output Models used for Consumption-base Emissions and Resource
Accounting, 68 Ecological Economics 211-222 (2009).
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fossil fuels are burned in South Korea to produce steel, which is subsequently
made into an automobile in Japan, and which is shipped to and driven in the
United States, the Framework Convention attributes the emissions from the steel
production to South Korea, emissions from the automobile fabrication to Japan,
and emissions from gasoline combustion to the United States. By knowing the
inputs to steel production and how steel is traded, and automobile production and
how automobiles are traded, we can attribute the emissions to the ultimate
consumers in the United States.
The GTAP 7 database provides us with input-output tables which tell us
the inputs into each industry and where the outputs go. Many of the outputs from
an industry will go to other industries while some will be consumed. The inputoutput tables allow us to trace the flow of goods through the economy to their
final consumption. By tracing fossil fuels through these tables, we can determine
where goods produced from the combustion of fossil fuels are eventually
consumed. In the automobile example, we can see that the fossil fuels burned in
South Korea produce steel which is an input into automobile production in Japan,
whose output is sold in the United States. Performing this analysis systematically
on a global basis allows us convert production measures of emissions into
consumption measures and to see the extent of trade in embedded carbon.
Table 3 presents our calculations for 2004. Each entry represents
emissions from production in the region in that row which is then consumed in the
region in that column, measured in million metric tons of CO2. For example, the
United States emitted 280 million tons of CO2 to produce goods ultimately
consumed in the EU. The sum across a row is the total emissions from production.
in a given region. The sum down a column is the total emissions from
consumption in a given region. 30

30

The region labeled JAZ is an aggregate of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. CHK is
China and South Korea. LAM is all of Latin American including Mexico, the Caribbean, and
South and Central America, and ROW includes all other non-Annex B regions: Africa, the Middle
East, and South and Southeast Asia.
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Annex B

2004
Mt CO2

Non-Annex B

US

EU

RUS

JAZ

CAN

CHK

LAM

ROW

Prod.

US

5,012

280

7

95

177

109

209

112

6,002

EU

303

3928

63

72

28

96

66

306

4,863

RUS

71

408

1,468

22

3

83

22

100

2,178

JAZ

84

82

3

1,146

8

160

12

98

1,593

CAN

248

33

1

9

223

12

8

10

543

CHK

577

587

32

390

50

3,679

103

478

5,897

LAM

293

122

6

18

16

36

956

40

1,487

ROW

300

657

31

289

20

376

55

3,199

4,928

Cons.

6,888

6,096

1,610

2,043

526

4,551

1,432

4,344

27,491

877

1,235

-566

488

-19

-1,345

-56

-584

Net

Table 3: Carbon Matrix for 2004, in Mt of CO2

The standard approach to attributing emissions can be seen by reading
down the right-most column, which gives emissions from production in each
region. In 2004, the United States was the largest emitter followed closely by
China/South Korea (CHK in the table). The EU and ROW (the rest of the world)
are next. Global emissions were around 27,500 megatons of CO2. 31
Consumption figures are in the row labeled Cons. The United States
consumed 6,888 megatons of CO2 compared to its production of 6002 megatons.
This means that the United States was a net importer of 877 megatons CO2: the
goods that it imported had 877 more megatons of embedded CO2 than the goods
that it exported. The bottom row shows the net imports. The European Union was
the largest net importer of embedded CO2, with net imports of 1,235 megatons.
China and South Korea (CHK) are large exporters of CO2, together exporting
1,345 megatons. Therefore, when we examine emissions on a consumption basis
rather than a production basis, the developed world has comparatively more
emissions; the choice by the Framework Convention to allocate emissions based
on a production measure favors the developed world.
31

Note that we use 2004 data because this is the most recent year for the database used in
our computational model. More recent emissions data are available and can be readily accessed in
the CAIT database, found at www.cait.wri.org. In 2007, total global emissions were around
33,500 megatons and China was the largest emitter, producing 6,703 megatons compared to 5,827
megatons for the United States. The CAIT data is aggregated from IPCC data and other sources.
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Business as usual emissions and sensitivity

Using CIM-EARTH, we project these current patterns to the future under
a business as usual (BAU) policy – i.e., assuming no change in carbon policy
from that already in place. Figure 6 gives our overall simulations of BAU
emissions and shows how the estimates vary when we vary our assumptions about
the growth of labor productivity and energy efficiency. The thin gray lines show
how our estimates change when we change our assumptions about the growth of
energy-efficiency. The colored groups show how changes in assumptions about
labor productivity change our results.

Figure 6: Ensemble of model output for a BAU policy scenario and a range of energy efficiency
and labor productivity assumptions.

Figure 7 shows how our results compare to the results of other
simulations. Our results are higher than the EIA estimates (red) but in the central
range for the IPCC estimates (light gray lines).
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Figure 7: Comparison of historical data (blue), 2005-2009 EIA forecasts (red), IPCC scenarios
(light gray), and baseline for ranges of labor productivity and energy efficiency (black lines).

Finally, for each simulation, we can determine which regions are
producing and consuming CO2 using the same matrix format we used above to
present the 2004 data. Table 4 provides the breakdown for our central assessment
of emissions in 2020. Comparing Table 3, we can see that emissions go up by
59% to 43.8 billion tons. By far the largest expected growth is in emissions from
China, which we expect to go up by 130%. Russian emissions are expected to go
up by 85%.
2020
Mt CO2

US

EU

Annex B
RUS JAZ

CAN

Non-Annex B
CHK LAM ROW

Prod.

2004

US

6,583

335

12

117

224

244

268

165

7,951

6,002

EU

377

4,347

102

80

35

195

81

429

5,648

4,863

RUS

138

671

2,644

37

6

282

40

215

4,035

2,178

JAZ

89

85

4

1,266

8

290

14

125

1,852

1,593

CAN

331

40

1

10

296

29

12

16

738

543

CHK

1,338

1,298

99

697

121

8,673

228

1,129

13,586

5,897

LAM

391

148

11

21

20

91

1,273

61

2,020

1,487

ROW

447

867

59

345

31

930

78

5,198

7,960

4,928

Cons.

9,697

7,796

2,935

2,543

746

10,736

1,998

7,338

43,791

27,491

Table 4: Carbon Matrix for 2020 BAU Scenario, central case, in megatons of CO2
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Simulations

We consider a number of different tax simulations. We start by comparing global
emissions reductions under three different taxes: a global carbon tax, a production
tax in Annex B countries, and a BTA tax in Annex B countries, all under various
tax rates. Figure 8 presents our results. (Note that we keep the axes the same as in
Figure 2 to allow comparison of the analytic model and CIM-EARTH.)
CIM EARTH
0

Carbon Tax ($/t of CO2)
10

20

30

40

50

0%
-5%

Reduction (% of global)

-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%
-30%
-35%
-40%
-45%
-50%

Global Reductions-AB Tax
Global Reductions-BTA
AB Reductions-AB Tax
Global Reductions-Global Tax

-55%

Figure 8: simulation of global emissions reductions under various taxes.

The figure illustrates three results from the model. The first is that a
carbon tax only in Annex B, regardless of whether it includes BTAs, has limited
potential to reduce global emissions. Under our simulations, an Annex B tax will
reduce emissions by only about ⅓ as much as a global tax. The reason is
straightforward: most of the growth in emissions is expected to come from nonAnnex B countries. The limited effectiveness of an Annex B tax is not by-andlarge a result of leakage; it is because major sources of emissions are omitted.
The second result is that leakage rates are between 15 and 25 percent. We
can get a visual sense of leakage by comparing the AB reductions under the AB
tax to the global reductions under the AB tax. The higher global emissions are a
result of an increase in energy use in non-Annex B countries.
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Finally, emissions in CIM-EARTH are far less sensitive to carbon taxes
than are emissions in the analytic model. This difference can be seen by
comparing Figure 8 and Figure 2, which show the same scenarios in the two
models. The analytic model shows reductions of 55 percent for a global carbon
tax of around $50/ton of CO2 while CIM-EARTH produces only 36 percent
reductions. The analytic model produces reductions of 28 percent for the
production tax in Home while CIM-EARTH produces reductions of only 13
percent for the Annex B tax.
We suspect that these differences relate to the ability to substitute away
from energy in the two models. The analytic model was parameterized so that the
relative shares of various inputs are roughly the same as in CIM-EARTH. For
example, relative energy resources in the two regions correspond to the relative
energy resources in Annex B and non-Annex B countries. The analytic model,
however, uses a fixed substitution elasticity between energy and labor of 1 due to
the use of a simplified functional form for which it was possible to obtain a
closed-form solution to the model. CIM-EARTH sets the equivalent elasticity at
0.5. This small elasticity makes it more difficult to shift away from energy in
CIM-EARTH when we add a carbon tax. As a result, we expect lower reductions
in CIM-EARTH than we see in the analytic model. 32
Figure 9 examines the effects of border taxes. As in the analytic model,
emissions in Annex B are higher when there are border taxes. To the extent that
Annex B commits to emissions reductions goals, it is easier to meet them with a
pure production tax than with BTAs. The reason is that more production shifts to
non-taxing regions under a production tax.
Comparing global and Annex B reductions under a BTA system shows
that border taxes reduce leakage substantially. As in the analytic model, this result
arises because of a reduction in emissions in non-Annex B countries and an
increase in emissions in Annex B. We can see the increase in Annex B emissions
by comparing the bottom two lines in Figure 9. The global reductions can be seen
by comparing the top two lines. Leakage with BTA’s is based on the difference in
the middle two lines.

32

Preliminary tests of CIM-EARTH using a substitution elasticity between energy and
capital/labor inputs of 1 show sensitivities similar to those in the analytic model.
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Figure 9: Reductions in emissions in Annex B countries at a percent of 2020 BAU scenario

Examining the carbon matrices provides additional insight. Table 5 gives
the carbon matrices for an Annex B production tax at $29/ton tax on CO2. 33 The
numbers are percent changes from the BAU scenario (given in Table 4).
AB-29
v. ref

JAZ

CAN

Non-Annex B
CHK
LAM
ROW

Prod.

-21.5

-26.1

-21.3

-24.6

-29.4

-28.7

-26.4

-23.3

-19.5

-18.3

-17.8

-21.8

-23.4

-28.1

-23.4

-38.0

-33.8

-29.3

-34.6

-4.0

-37.5

-39.7

-35.6

-31.4

JAZ

-14.5

-14.5

-17.4

-33.0

-18.8

-22.3

-19.3

-25.0

-28.8

CAN

-21.0

-18.9

-16.4

-19.2

-26.1

-20.4

-20.3

-21.0

-22.9

CHK

1.2

1.7

1.8

2.9

1.9

2.9

2.2

1.2

2.4

LAM

24.8

13.5

46.7

4.0

25.3

2.8

6.5

5.1

10.8

ROW

8.2

12.5

18.2

15.0

8.1

6.2

9.4

4.7

6.6

Cons.

-19.0

-15.0

-26.6

-15.5

-16.8

0.3

-1.2

-0.2

-9.9

US

EU

US

-26.9

-18.9

EU

-23.7

RUS

Annex B
RUS

Table 5: Percent changes from 2020 BAU for a $29/ton CO2 tax in Annex B

33

We ran our simulations in carbon rather than CO2. Table 5 is for a $105/ton carbon tax,
which translates to a $28.64/ton tax on carbon dioxide.
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The easiest way to read the table is to consider the four large blocks. The
upper left-hand block is production taking place in Annex B countries consumed
in those countries. (The diagonal represents production in a given country
consumed there. The off-diagonal entries are trade within Annex B.) This
production goes down significantly. The lower left-hand block represents imports
into Annex B countries from non-Annex B production. As we expect, we see an
increase in imports: it is relatively less expensive to purchase energy-intensive
goods produced abroad because of the carbon tax. Similarly, if we look at the
upper right-hand block, we see a decrease in production in Annex B countries for
export into non-Annex B countries. It is more difficult for domestic industries to
compete in the export market.
The lower right-hand block is production in non-Annex B countries
consumed locally. We can see that this goes up, uniformly. The reason is the
lower price of energy due to decreased use in Annex B. This is the second form of
leakage discussed above. We can see the net effect by comparing production in
Annex B countries (the right-hand column) to consumption in Annex B countries
(the bottom row): production declines by more than consumption, showing
production leakage.
Table 6 presents the carbon matrix for the BTA tax, again showing percent
changes from our BAU simulations. The key block is the lower left-hand corner
which shows Annex B imports from non-Annex B countries. This goes from an
increase in the production tax case to a decrease in the BTA tax case. Border taxes
reduce the incentive to purchase energy-intensive goods from abroad.
BTA
v. ref.

US

EU

Annex B
RUS

JAZ

CAN

Non-Annex B
CHK
LAM
ROW

US

-25.3

-18.0

-20.5

-17.9

-20.0

-23.2

-16.6

-21.4

-21.4

EU

-13.5

-20.2

-17.5

-16.0

-15.7

-25.9

-21.8

-23.2

-20.0

RUS

-31.6

-32.5

-30.3

-29.0

-33.5

-16.4

-19.0

-12.4

-28.6

JAZ

-13.6

-16.0

-16.6

-26.3

-18.8

-25.0

-21.0

-22.3

-19.5

CAN

-15.7

-19.2

-13.7

-18.4

-23.2

-25.0

-21.0

-22.6

-19.5

CHK

-8.0

-9.0

-10.0

-9.9

-10.3

3.1

9.3

5.5

0.3

LAM

-9.6

-2.8

15.2

-1.6

-3.0

-1.2

4.1

0.5

0.5

ROW

-4.2

-5.8

-6.4

-7.0

-4.8

1.7

7.6

3.2

1.1

Cons.

-20.5

-17.3

-28.4

-18.3

-18.5

.05

.02

.04

-10.7

Table 6: Carbon Matrix for BTA tax in Annex B at $29/ton CO2.

Prod.
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Looking at the upper right-hand block we can also a smaller reduction in
non-Annex B consumption of carbon imports from Annex B countries (relative to
the production tax case). This is as expected because the border tax removes the
tax on these exports from Annex B. The upper-left and lower right-hand blocks
represent production and consumption internal to each region. With border taxes
we see slightly lower reductions in emissions in Annex B (for goods consumed in
Annex B). Emissions from production in non-Annex B consumed locally show a
mixed pattern, with Chinese emissions going up with border taxes and emissions
from other regions going down.
2.4

Robustness/sensitivity/replication

A central problem with estimating the size of the effects of a regional
carbon tax is that we are unsure of many of the central elasticities. As noted,
elasticities cannot be directly observed; they have to be econometrically
estimated, and the data that might be used for this estimation is scarce. Because of
the uncertainty in these parameters, we check the robustness of our results to
changes in the central elasticities.
Another problem with CGE modeling of the problem is that it can be
difficult to compare CGE results with one another because model structures vary
in subtle ways and the underlying data and elasticities may be different. To
respond to this problem, we attempt to replicate the choices of elasticities we find
in other models.
Robustness checks and replication are similar in that in both cases we
compute results within our model for alternative choices of the central parameters.
We can perform both activities at the same time by making sure that our
sensitivity analyses encompass the parameter choices used in other models. We
present two of our results here. 34
The first sensitivity result we present is the sensitivity of leakage to
changes in the price elasticity of energy supply, ψES, which as we indicated above
for the analytic model, we expect to be a central parameter. A low ψES means that
the supply of energy does not change much when the price changes, while a high
ψES indicates that supply is highly sensitive to price. We expect leakage to be
higher when ψES is low. Figure 10 presents these results.

34

Addition robustness checks are available at www.rdecep.org .
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of leakage to ψES for a $29/ton CO2 tax in Annex B, no BTA’s

The left-most two graphs show the change in emissions in Annex B and
non-Annex B as we change ψES. The vertical difference between the two lines –
BAU and AB-28 – highlighted in gray is the change in emissions due to the tax
for various values of ψES. We can see in the left-most graph that the change in
emissions is quite sensitive to ψES for low values. There is little effect in nonAnnex B regions. The net effect is that leakage is highly sensitive to ψES,
primarily because of its effect in Annex B. The red dots represent the leakage
rates and value of ψES used in prior studies. 35
The second result we show is an attempt to reproduce as closely as
possible the full parameter set used in 19 prior studies. 36 The parameters that we
35

For a list of prior studies, see note 37.
Alain Bernard & Marc Vielle, Allocation efficace d’un cout global d’environnement
entre pays: permis negociables VS taxes ou permis negociables ET taxes?, Economie
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Henry D. Jacoby, Developing country effects of Kyoto-type emissions restrictions, MIT Joint
program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 53 (1999); Mustafa H. Babiker,
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ECO/WKP (2000)15, Paris: OECD; Jean-Marc Burniaux, and Troung P. Truong, GTAP-E, and
energy-environmental version of GTAP, Technical Paper No. 16 (2002), available at
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consider include the Armington elasticities, the elasticity of substitution of energy
goods, and the price elasticity of energy supply. Figure 11 shows the leakage
reported in prior studies compared to the closest parameter fit within our model.
We show the full set of estimates in the left-hand graph. In the right-hand graph,
we eliminate an outlier study. We can explain much of the variation in leakage
estimates as due to variations in parameters. CIM-EARTH, however, predicts
higher leakage than the comparison models when using the same parameter set.
CIM EARTH v. Other Models

Without outlier
0.4

1.2

Burniaux
Babiker

CIM EARTH Replication

CIM EARTH replication

1
Babiker

0.8
y=x
0.6

0.4

0.3

Light
Gerlaugh

y=x
Kuik

Bernard
Kallbekken

Alexeeva
Paltsev

0.2

Bollen
Elliott
Bernstein

Mattoo
McKibben
Babiker

0.1

Winchester

0.2

Manders

0
0

0.4

0.8

Model leakage rate

1.2

0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Model Leakage Rate

Figure 11: replication of parameters in prior models

4.5

Proxy tax simulations

Border tax adjustments are likely to be difficult to implement. To
determine the tax on imports, a customs agent would have to know the marginal
source of energy used for each stage of production for an imported good. A
finished good may have elements produced in many countries with many different
http://econstor.eu/dspace/handle/10419/28514; Steffen Kallbekken, Line S. Flotorp, and Nathan
Rive, CDM baseline approaches and carbon leakage, 35 Energy Policy 4154-4163 (2007);
Andreas Loschel, Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi, Tim Mennel, Climate Policy and the Problem of
Competitiveness: Border Tax Adjustments or Integrated Emission Trading, ZEW Discussion
Paper 08-061, available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/7384.html; Paul Veenendall and
Ton Manders, Border tax adjustments and the EU-ETS, a quantitative assessment, CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Document 171 (2008), available at
http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/border-tax-adjustment-and-eu-ets-quantitative-assessment;
Aaditya Mattoo, Arvind Subramanian, Dominique Van der Mensbrugghe, and Jianwu He,
Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy¸ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
5123 (2009); Niven Winchester, Sergey Palstev and John Reilly, Will Border Carbon Adjustments
Work, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 184 (2010);
Warick J. McKibbin and Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border
Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy, 2008/2009 Brookings Trade Forum 1-34 (2009).
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energy sources, making this task difficult. Worse, to give foreign firms the correct
incentive to use low-carbon production methods, the tax has to be sensitive to the
particular production choices and energy sources used for each good. For
example, if the tax rate is based on national averages, individual firms in a given
country would not have an incentive to switch to low-carbon production as doing
so would have no effect on the tax imposed and would increase costs. Border tax
adjustments may also be contrary to WTO law. In particular, the tax would be
based on production methods and therefore “like” products may face different
taxes. 37
To address these concerns, we consider three imperfect border tax
regimes. The first is border tax adjustments based on the average emissions from
production of a good in the importing country. There are two intuitions behind
this approach: (1) local customs agents may have better information about
domestic production methods than about foreign production methods, so it would
be easier to implement; and (2) it may appeal to domestic industry because it
imposes the same tax on imports as domestic industry faces. The disadvantage of
this approach is that the tax is unrelated to the actual emissions from production
of a good abroad. Foreign firms have no incentive to alter their production in
response to the tax. In Figures 12 and 13, where we show our results, this tax is
labeled BTA-Regional.
The second is a global system of border tax adjustments where the border
tax and the rebate on export are based on a schedule set by a global entity such as
the WTO or the UN. The schedule we model is, for each category of goods, equal
to the global average emissions from the production of those goods. The intuition
here is that border tax adjustments might be part of a global climate agreement. In
addition, once negotiated, a schedule would be easy for countries to impose. The
disadvantages are similar to the disadvantages of border taxes based on domestic
emissions in the production of like goods. In Figures 12 and 13, this policy is
labeled BTA-UN.
The final imperfect system we consider is import tariffs. These are
perfectly calculated border taxes but imposed only on imports without the
corresponding rebate on export. These are punitive, and we imagine them being
37

There is a large literature on the legality of border tax adjustments for carbon taxes and
cap and trade systems, including Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff, Border tax adjustments: a
feasible way to support stringent emission trading, 24 European J Law Econ 137 (2007); Gavin
Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 38
Journal of World Trade 395 (2004).
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imposed in response to domestic demands by industry fearful of carbon leakage.
We label this system Tariff.
Our results are presented in Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 shows the global
emissions reductions under these scenarios, compared to a production tax.
Comparing the production tax (the top line) to the other taxes, we can see that all
of the border tax systems reduce emissions more than a pure production tax. The
reasons are similar to the reasons perfect BTA reduces emissions, as discussed
above: emissions in Annex B will go up but emissions in non-Annex B regions go
down by more.
CIM EARTH
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10

20

30

40

50

0%

Reduction (% of global)

-2%
-4%
-6%
-8%

-10%
-12%

Global Reductions-AB Tax
Global Reductions-BTA-Regional
Global-Reductions-BTA-UN

-14%

Global Reductions-Tariff
Global Reductions-BTA

-16%

Figure 12: Global emissions reductions under imperfect BTAs.

Figure 13 shows the leakage rate under each scenario. Perfect border taxes
reduce leakage the most. The reason is likely that only perfect border taxes
provide the correct incentives to reduce emissions in foreign production.
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Figure 13: Leakage rate under tax scenarios; labels the same as Figure 12

Comparing the tariff lines in Figures 12 and 13, we can see that tariffs
reduce global emissions in almost exactly the same amounts as perfect BTAs but
generate more leakage. The difference between a tariff and border tax adjustments
is that border tax adjustments have a rebate on export while tariffs do not. The
tariff, by not providing a rebate for exports from Annex B, reduces Annex B
emissions by more than perfect border taxes, so the denominator in the leakage
measure is bigger (tending to reduce the leakage rate). Offsetting this effect,
emissions increases in non-Annex B regions are greater under the tariff than under
perfect border taxes because there is actually a greater incentive to shift
production abroad: Annex B production for export to non-Annex B countries is
not as competitive as local production in non-Annex B countries (for consumption
there). An exporting Annex B industry therefore may shift production to a nonAnnex B country. The net result is around double the leakage.
The UN and regional border tax systems also do not perform as well as
perfect border taxes. These systems have higher overall emissions and higher
leakage. The reasons here likely relate to the imperfect incentives these systems
impose on non-Annex B production. Because the taxes do not respond to
production choices, there is a lower incentive to alter those choices. We do not
consider the administrative costs of the alternative systems. If the administrative
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savings are great enough, it may be worth adopting one of these alternative
systems notwithstanding their poorer performance.
5.

Conclusions

We had a number of goals for this study. One was to introduce CGE modeling of
a legal problem and to consider ways that it can be made useful and accessible. To
do this, we developed a simplified analytic model of the problem with the same
core structure as the CGE model. The simplified model provides economic
intuitions which we then simulate in the CGE model. We parameterized the
analytic model to match the CGE model so that we could test the sensitivity of the
analytic model results to the variables we use in the CGE model. We also made
our CGE code open source, provide extensive sensitivity and robustness checks,
and attempt to replicate prior studies within our model. While we suspect that
CGE modeling of legal problems will remain difficult to do and difficult to
understand for many legal analysts, it may be the best way to study certain classes
of problems.
A second goal was to understand the structure of the leakage problem and
to understand which parameters drive leakage. One central conclusion in this
regard is that a key variable is the price elasticity of energy supply. For both
production taxes and border taxes, a low price elasticity of energy supply means
that leakage is likely to be high. What really matters for global emissions is the
total amount of fossil fuels extracted. If energy supply is inelastic, a regional
carbon tax will have little effect on global extraction. These results show up in
both our analytic model and in our CGE model. In thinking about the design of
regional emissions systems, it might be wise to focus on energy supply as much
as on demand.
A third goal was to simulate a variety of tax policies to understand their
likely effects. Within our CGE model, we consider perfect border taxes and a
number of imperfect taxes such as a tax based on a global schedule of emissions
for different types of goods. Our simulations show that imperfect border taxes
may be significantly inferior at reducing leakage than perfect border taxes. The
reason appears to relate to the incentives on foreign producers: with imperfect
taxes they gain no benefit from switching to clean production technologies. Our
simulations also show the importance of global emissions reductions policies.
Carbon taxes only in Annex B have limited potential to reduce emissions, and this
is not a result of leakage. Even without leakage, the large expected increases in
emissions in the developing world swamp the potential reductions in Annex B.
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Appendix
We present below the core equations and parameter values from the analytic
model.
Function
Endowments
(asterisks indicate the foreign country)
Production of l-good

Form
Home: L and E
Foreign: L* and E*

Ql = Ll
Ql* = L*l
β

Qenergy
Energy production in each country
*
energy

Q

 Lenergy  1− β
=
 E
 β 
 L*energy

 β

β

 *(1− β )
 E


Trade in energy (M is demand)

*
Qenergy + Qenergy
=
M e + M e*

Production of ei-good

L 
Qei =  ei  M e1−δ
 δ 

δ

δ

 L* 
1−δ
Q =  ei  M e*( )
 δ 
*
ei*

U = ( Cei )

αH

Utility

( Cei* ) ( Cl )

U * = ( Cei* * )

αH

αF

(C ) (C )
* αF
ei

L=
Lei + Lenergy + Ll
L* =
L*ei* + L*energy + L*l
Market clearing

Q=
Cei* + Cei
ei
Q=
Cei* * + Cei*
ei*
Ql + Ql* = Cl + Cl*

Parameter
Share of income spent on own variety,
𝛼𝐻
Share of income spent on imported
variety, 𝛼𝐹

Labor share in e-good production, 𝛽

Calibrated Value
0.15
0.07
0.74

1−α H −α F

* 1−α H −α F
l
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Labor share in ei/ei*-good production, 𝛿
𝐿

Share of labor in H, 𝐿𝑤

𝐸

Share of resource in H, 𝐸 𝑤

0.80
0.71
0.40
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